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Abstract—This paper addresses the theme automated bilateral 
negotiation of energy contracts. In this work, the automatic 
combination between different negotiation tactics is proposed. 
This combination is done dynamically throughout the negotiation 
process, as result from the online assessment that is performed 
after each proposal and counter-proposal. The proposed method 
is integrated in a decision support system for bilateral 
negotiations, called Decision Support for Energy Contracts 
Negotiations (DECON), which in turn is integrated with the 
Multi-Agent Simulator of Competitive Electricity Markets 
(MASCEM). This integration enables testing and validating the 
proposed methodology in a realistic market negotiation 
environment. A case study is presented, demonstrating the 
advantages of the proposed approach.  
Index Terms— Automated Negotiation, Bilateral Contracts, 
Decision Support Systems, Electricity Markets, Negotiation 
Strategies 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Many changes have occurred in the electricity market 
during the last decades, including its liberalization. Therefore, 
today these markets are very complex and unpredictable [1]. 
Beyond that, there are many markets around the world, each of 
them with its own rules, and some of them operating in more 
than one country. In addition, there are different types of 
markets. Some European examples are MIBEL – Iberian 
market [2], the northern Europe market Nord Pool Spot [3] and 
the EPEX Spot [4] which works in Germany, France, Austria 
and Switzerland. Currently the tendency in Europe is to evolve 
towards continental markets. In fact, countries like Italy, 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great-Britain, 
Portugal, Sweden and others have joined in an electricity 
market for day-ahead negotiations [5]. In Latin America, some 
countries have also joined in a common electricity market.  
The recent empowerment of consumers as central pieces in 
future power and energy systems, and the need to guarantee 
and incentivize the massive integration of renewable energy 
sources is leading to yet another paradigm shift – the 
introduction of local energy markets [6]. The introduction of 
local marketplaces is expected to increase the use of local 
generation and give the opportunity for consumers to play the 
so desired active role in this domain. Due to the fact that there 
are currently many different markets and types of negotiation; 
and that the tendency is for these negotiation opportunities to 
further expand; electricity market players, especially sellers, 
buyers and aggregators, have the increasing necessity to 
evaluate their investments and optimize their negotiation 
strategies in order to be able to guarantee as much benefit from 
energy negotiation as possible [7]. 
There are several approaches that address the field of 
decision support for automated negotiation, including in the 
energy domain, as discussed in section II. However, these 
approaches share a common gap: the lack of capabilities to 
adapt the negotiation approach along the negotiation process. 
The negotiation strategies and tactics are usually defined 
before the start of the negotiation, and are enforced until the 
end of the negotiation procedure. This, however, prevents the 
dynamic online adaptation to the most recent perceived events.   
This paper contributes to surpassing this gap by proposing 
an automated negotiation approach that combines different 
negotiation tactics throughout the negotiation process, 
according to the online assessment of the strategies results that 
is performed after each proposal and counter-proposal. The 
proposed method is integrated in a decision support system for 
bilateral negotiations, called Decision Support for Energy 
Contracts Negotiations (DECON) [8], which in turn is 
integrated with the Multi-Agent Simulator of Competitive 
Electricity Markets (MASCEM) [9]. This integration enables 
the testing and validation of the proposed approach, in a 
realistic simulated market environment. 
After this introductory section, section II presents a 
discussion on related work, focusing on the field of automated 
negotiation. Section III described the proposed methodology, 
and section IV presents the case study that enables assessing 
the performance of the proposed methodology. Finally, section 
V presents the conclusions of this work. 
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II. RELATED WORK 
The bilateral contracts negotiation process is typically 
divided into three steps. In the first step, the players define their 
“objectives, negotiation limits and initial offers” [10], this is 
called the pre-negotiation step. Afterwards, players try to reach 
an agreement, using strategies for negotiating. In the final step, 
called implementation phase, if an agreement has been 
achieved the contract is put in practice.  
Regarding the actual bilateral negotiations, usually there 
are three main strategies that are used [10]: 
• Concession making: a negotiator reduces its profit to 
be able to make an agreement with the opposing player; 
•  Competing: a negotiator holds its selling/buying 
terms and negotiators and tries to persuade the other player to 
fulfill its terms; 
 • Problem solving: negotiators work with each other in 
order to achieve a reasonable price for both. This strategy may 
be divided into 2 sub-strategies [11], which are logrolling and 
nonspecific compensation. Logrolling consists in each player 
conceding in low-priority issues for themselves and high-
priority for the other player. In nonspecific compensation, one 
of the players accomplishes his goals and pays the other for 
fulfilling its interests. 
Strategies can also be classified as one of the following 
three types [12, 13]:  
• Time dependent – If a player has a certain deadline 
while negotiating, the strategy considers it, usually leading to 
a higher reduction of profits near the deadline; 
• Resource dependent – Similar to time dependent 
strategies, but in this case the factor taken into account is a 
certain limited resource, which affects the way of negotiating; 
• Behaviour dependent – It depends on the behaviour 
of the opposite player and tries to achieve the best result based 
in that behaviour. 
A recent study developed new tactics for bilateral 
negotiations [13]. The tactics are called Conceder, Moderate 
Conceder, Linear, Moderate Hardheaded and Hardheaded. The 
approaches from these tactics change, respectively, from 
conceding a lot in prices in the beginning (Conceder) until 
conceding just a bit in the end (Hardheaded). In the field of 
automated negotiation of bilateral contracts, the most used 
learning methods are Bayesian Learning, Non-linear 
Regression, Kernel Density Estimation and Artificial Neural 
Networks [14]. An algorithm for choosing the best strategy 
among a number of available strategies can be found in [15]. 
Nowadays there is a need to provide decision support to the 
players in the electricity market. Although there are already 
some simulators that enable studying specific problems in the 
power and energy domain, there is a lack of support solutions 
for the negotiation of bilateral contracts. GECAD’s MASCEM 
simulator already provides support decision for bilateral 
markets [9], but it is still possible to improve its performance, 
namely in the negotiation step and in the choice of the best 
strategy for approaching a negotiation. With this improvement, 
it is possible to have more profits while selling and buying 
electricity [8]. The main contributions from this work, towards 
surpassing the identified gaps are: 
• Analysis and development of tactics to be used in the 
negotiation of bilateral contracts; 
• Complete analysis of the best strategy to use as a 
counter strategy against each opponent at each time; 
• Improvement of bilateral negotiations’ results. 
III. PROPOSED APPROACH 
This section describes the tactics developed in the scope of 
this work, as well as the proposed tactics combination. In order 
to develop the bilateral negotiation tactics, an analysis of 
possible solutions has been performed. After analyzing some 
existing tactics it was necessary to formulate mathematically 
the models that could express the behaviour associated with 
each tactic. Some of the developed tactics, namely 
Determined, Anxious, Gluttonous and Moderated, were based 
in the general principles of the four strategies of ALBidS [16]; 
however, these have been adapted in the scope of this work. 
An important parameter to consider while using these 
tactics is the price range that a player wants to use for a 
negotiation. A seller must detail the maximum and minimum 
price for selling; the maximum price is used as the initial price 
for negotiating, and the minimum price is used as absolute 
limit. A buyer has to define the minimum and maximum price 
that it is willing to pay. The minimum price is used as the initial 
price in the negotiation. Also, buyers and sellers need to define 
the maximum number of proposals N that they are willing to 
make before ending a negotiation. The following sub-sections 
detail the developed tactics, where Max is the maximum price 
for selling (for a seller) and for buying (in case of a buyer). Min 
is the minimum selling price for sellers and minimum (starting) 
buying price if it is a tactic for buyers. For each proposal, x 
represents its number and y represents its value. 
A. Time-dependent 
1) Determined Seller 
Price is constant throughout negotiation and it is 
calculated by the average of the maximum and minimum 





2) Moderated Seller 
Price decreases steadily throughout the negotiation. The 
formalization of this tactic is based on the linear equation, 
where b is the maximum price and x the number of the 




∗ 𝑥 +  𝑏;  (2) 
3) Gluttonous Seller 
Price descends slightly until the end of the negotiation; when 
the end is approaching, it declines significantly so that an 
agreement can be guaranteed. In order to control if the decline 
is bigger or smaller, a decrease factor represented as D, has 
been added to the equation. Standard value for decrease factor 
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D is 0.9 and it can only change between 0.2 and 1.1. In case D 
is 0.2 the price almost does not decrease in the end, and in this 
case it is a very gluttonous seller. If D=1.1, the last proposal is 
almost equal to the minimum price defined in the beginning 
and the final proposals will be much smaller than previous 
ones. This tactic is defined as in (3), where D is the decrease 
factor. 
𝑦 =
(𝑀𝑎𝑥 − 𝑀𝑖𝑛) ∗ 𝐷
𝑥 − 𝑁
+ 𝑀 +
(𝑀𝑎𝑥 − 𝑀𝑖𝑛) ∗ 𝐷  
𝑁
 (3) 
4) Anxious Seller 
In this tactic, sellers reduce their selling price in the start of 
the negotiation, with small reductions in the end. A decrease 
factor D is also used, whose standard value is 0.6 and D can 
vary between 0.2 and 1.5. The bigger the value, the bigger the 







+ 𝑀𝑖𝑛 (4) 
5) Seller - Percentage decrease 
In this case, the price falls in a constant percentage value, 
represented by P, in each step of the negotiation. It gives a 
seller the possibility to choose the degree of the decrease in 
price, as in (5). 
𝑦 = (1 − 𝑃) ∗ (𝑦(𝑥 − 1));   𝑦(0) = 𝑀𝑎𝑥 (5) 
B. Behaviour-dependent 
This section describes the developed behavior-dependent 
tactics for sellers. During the negotiation selling prices 
decrease in a certain percentage, a “buyer percentage” 
represented by Pb, related with the percentage variation 
between the two previous offers of the buyer. Furthermore, 
sellers can choose a “seller percentage” represented by Pcs, 
allowing them to specify if they want to strictly follow buyers’ 
price variation or have a lower variation. For example, if a 
buyer offers 50 euros and then rises to 50.5 euros, price 
variation is 1%, so Pb=1%. If a seller decides that Pcs=80% 
his offers will decrease 0.8% (80%*1%).  
Pb = last offer (buyer)/ second to last offer (buyer), the 
mathematical formulation of this tactic is represented in (6) 
and a negotiation using this strategy is illustrated in Fig. 6.  
𝑦 = 𝑦(𝑥 − 1) − (𝑦(𝑥 − 1) ∗ (𝑃𝑏 − 1) ∗ 𝑃𝑐𝑠) (6) 
Fig. 1 shows an example for this strategy. Seller’s maximum 
and minimum price are 53€/MWh and 33 €/MWh. Buyer’s 
price offers were randomly chosen and Pcs =80%. 
 
Fig. 1– Seller based on buyer’s behaviour 
C. Combined Tactics 
In order to enable the on-line adaptation during the 
negotiation process, and endow negotiation tactics with some 
dynamism, some tactics are combined. These procedure for 
each individual tactic is the same as described before, the main 
difference is that the player’s proposal is based on prices 
calculated by different strategies throughout the time. These 
strategies are detailed as follows. The examples shown 
consider N=8. 
1) Gluttonous+Anxious seller 
This strategy mixes seller’s gluttonous and anxious 
strategies, allowing a hard approach in the beginning of the 
negotiation, changing to a conceding strategy in the end. 
Considering that a seller wants to stop negotiating after 8 
proposals, the first 4 proposals are using the Gluttonous tactic 
and the last 4 using the Anxious tactic. Figure 2 details this 
strategy. 
 
Fig. 2 – Gluttonous+Anxious seller 
2) Gluttonous+Anxious+Gluttonous Seller 
This tactic also combines Gluttonous and Anxious tactics, 
the difference is that in the end Gluttonous tactic is used again. 
In this situation the first 3 offers are from Gluttonous tactic, 
offers 4, 5 and 6 from Anxious tactic and 7 and 8 again from 
Gluttonous approach, as can be seen in Fig. 3. The main 
advantage of using the Gluttonous approach in the end again 
in this case is to try getting as much profit as possible, 
preventing from conceding too much in the final counter-
proposals. 
 
Fig. 3 - Gluttonous+Anxious+Gluttonous Seller 
3) Anxious+Gluttonous+Anxious Seller 
In this case, a seller decreases price in the start of the 
bargaining, then price keeps almost without alterations until 
the end, finishing with a new yielding. This technique allowed 
reaching an agreement in most simulated negotiations. At the 
start there an accentuated decrease in order to make the 
opponent interested in achieving a fast agreement, but then the 
seller becomes rigid, bluffing that it is reaching its limit price; 
however, near the end of the negotiation, it concedes again, in 
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order to guarantee the establishment of the agreement. 
Proposals number 1,2,3,7 and 8 are from Anxious strategy and 
the remaining from Gluttonous, as showed in Fig 4. 
 
Fig. 4 - Anxious+Gluttonous+Anxious Seller 
4) Gluttonous+Anxious+Glut+Anxious+Glut. Seller 
The purpose of this tactic is to make different variations in 
price throughout the negotiation. Proposals number 1,2,5,6 and 
8 are obtained from Gluttonous strategy and 3, 4 and 7 from 
Anxious strategy. The variation of prices that occurs with this 
strategy is shown in Fig. 5. 
 
Fig. 5 - Gluttonous+Anxious+Gluttonous+Anxious+Gluttonous Seller 
Strategies developed for buyers are equal to the ones present 
for sellers, the only change is that prices increase instead of 
decreasing. 
IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
In order to realize which were the best counter-tactics for 
each of the developed tactics, simulations were performed and 
the results are shown in Table 1. Lines represent all the 
developed tactics and columns represent the counter-tactics. 
For each case, the best counter-tactic is marked with an X. As 
it can be seen, the Gluttonous is the most appropriate strategy 
against most of the tactics. Maximum and minimum prices 
were based on the average arithmetic price of the Iberian 
market in March 2015 [2]. 
As can be seen by Table 1, in case an opponent uses a 
Gluttonous tactic, the best approach is to use a 
Gluttonous+Anxious+Gluttonous strategy. Tables 2 and 3 
represent two cases where a seller negotiated with a Gluttonous 
buyer. In both tables, the first column details if an agreement 
has been made or not at the end of the negotiation. The second 
column shows the value of the last proposal made by the seller 
and the third column shows the number of the last proposal. In 
the negotiation of Table 2, seller’s minimum price was 33 
€/MWh, Max=53 €/MWh and N=8. For the buyer Min= 24 
€/MWh, Max=44 €/MWh and N=8. This case shows clearly 
that the combination of Gluttonous, Anxious and again 
Gluttonous strategy is the best approach when negotiating 
against a Gluttonous buyer. In the case presented in Table 3, 
the seller minimum price is 40€/MWh and Max=57 €/MWh. 
For the buyer Min=31€/MWh and Max=50 €/MWh. 
Table 2 – Negotiations against Gluttonous buyer, case 1 
Tactic Seller Agreed Last value by 
seller 
No. of last 
proposal 
Anxious Yes 36,85 8 
Determined No 43 8 
Gluttonous Yes 37,25 8 
Moderated Yes 35,5 8 
Percentage 4% No 42,82 8 
Glu+Anx Yes 38,49 8 
Glu+Anx+Glu Yes 39,62 8 
Anx+Glu+Anx Yes 36,85 8 
G+A+G+A+G Yes 38,29 8 
Behaviour dep. No 42,93 8 
Table 3 - Negotiations against Gluttonous buyer, case 2 
Tactic Seller Agreed Last value by 
seller 
No. of last 
proposal 
Anxious Yes 43,27 8 
Determined No 48,5 8 
Gluttonous Yes 43,61 8 
Moderated Yes 42,13 8 
Percentage 4% No 46,06 8 
Glu+Anx Yes 44,66 8 
Glu+Anx+Glu Yes 45,62 8 
Anx+Glu+Anx Yes 43,28 8 
G+A+G+A+G Yes 44,5 8 
Behaviour dep. No 48,69 8 
 





An Det Glu Mod Perc Glu+An Glu+An+Glu An+Glu+An G+A+G+A+G Beh.dep. 
Anxious   X        
Determined    X       
Gluttonous       X    
Moderated   X        
Percentage   X        
Glu+Anx   X        
Glu+Anx+Glu   X        
Anx+Glu+Anx   X        
G+A+G+A+G   X        
Behaviour dep.   X        
G,Glu – Gluttonous;  A, An,Anx – Anxious;  Det – Determined;  Mod – Moderated;  Perc – Percentage decrease; Beh.dep. – Behaviour dependent 
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From Table 2 it is visible that the 
Gluttonous+Anxious+Gluttonous tactic achieved a price of 
39,62 €/MWh, while the 2nd best (Gluttonous+Anxious), only 
got to 38,49. So, using the best tactic allows a profit of more 
than 1€/MWh. In the case presented in Table 3, the advantage 
is not so great, but it is still almost of 1€/MWh, since using 
Glu+Anx+Glu strategy the seller sold by 45,62 €/MWh and 
with other strategies it could not get more than 44,66 €/MWh. 
Furthermore, in both cases, when compared against non-mixed 
strategies, the profit is around 2€/MWh. The charts from Fig. 
6 and 7 illustrate the negotiations presented in Tables 2 and 3, 
respectively. All parameters are the same. In both charts the 
seller is using a mix of the Gluttonous, Anxious and 
Gluttonous tactics, which proved to be the best against this 
type of buyers. In Fig. 6 and 7, it is possible to realize why this 
tactic succeeds against a Gluttonous buyer. It reduces the 
selling price in the middle of the negotiation to accommodate 
the buyer’s expectations, but keeps a steady price in the end, 
whereas the buyer tries to achieve an agreement increasing his 
offers. This allows increasing selling prices against this type of 
buyer and obtain more profits. 
 
Figure 6 – Seller against Gluttonous buyer, case 1 
 
Figure 7 – Seller against Gluttonous buyer, case 2 
V. CONCLUSION 
The complexity of today’s electricity markets makes it 
difficult to negotiate without any help, if players desire to 
achieve profitable deals. Using specific negotiation strategies 
that suit each specific opponent is one of the ways to achieve 
better results in negotiations. 
This paper proposed ten strategies for bilateral negotiation 
in electricity markets. Starting from 4 traditional strategies, 
more strategies were developed by mixing the initial 4 in order 
to get a wider range of strategies and provide dynamism and 
adaptation capabilities to the supported player. Nine of the ten 
strategies developed are time-dependent and one is behaviour-
dependent. In order to assess which was the best counter-
strategy for each of the ten strategies, several negotiations were 
simulated using MASCEM and the results are presented. 
Results show that using a combination of strategies can be 
useful for some negotiations, as it enables achieving deals that 
are more advantageous. The findings of this work may be 
useful not only for electricity markets negotiations, but also in 
other fields which involve bilateral negotiations. 
REFERENCES 
[1] Sioshansi, F.P., “Evolution of Global Electricity Markets – New 
paradigms, new challenges, new approaches”, Academic Press, 2013. 
[2] MIBEL – homepage, Available: http://www.mibel.com, accessed on 
May 2017 
[3] Nord Pool – homepage, Available: http://www.nordpoolspot.com, 
accessed on May 2017 
[4] EPEX – homepage, Available: https://www.epexspot.com, accessed on 
May 2017 
[5] APX, Italian borders coupled, 2015, www.apxgroup.com/wp-
content/uploads/2015-02-
24_MRC_PCR_IBWT_Communication_SuccessfulGoLive.pdf, 
accessed on May 2017. 
[6] Olivella-Rosell, P. et al. “Day-ahead micro-market design for distributed 
energy resources”. IEEE International Energy Conference, (2016), 1-6. 
[7] T. Pinto, J. Barreto, I. Praça, G. Santos, Z. Vale, and E. J. S. Pires, “Multi-
agent based metalearner using genetic algorithm for decision support in 
electricity markets,” in 2015 18th International Conference on Intelligent 
System Application to Power Systems (ISAP), 2015, pp. 1–6. 
[8] T. Pinto, Z. Vale, I. Praça, E.J. Solteiro, F. Lopes. 2015. “Decision 
Support for Energy Contracts Negotiation with Game Theory and 
Adaptive Learning”. Energies. 
[9] Pinto, T., Morais, H., Sousa, T.M., Sousa, T., Vale, Z., Praça, I., Faia, R., 
Solteiro Pires, E.J., “Adaptive Portfolio Optimization for Multiple 
Electricity Markets Participation” IEEE Transactions on Neural 
Networks and Learning Systems, in press, August, 2015. 
[10] F. Sousa, “Bilateral Contracting in Liberalized Energy Markets: 
Contracts for Difference and Risk Management,” Lisbon, Portugal, Oct-
2014. 
[11] F. Lopes et al., “Multi-agent Simulation of Bilateral Contracting in 
Competitive Electricity Markets,” in 2014 25th International Workshop 
on Database and Expert Systems Applications, 2014, pp. 131–135. 
[12] E. Romanhuki, M. Fuckner, F. Enembreck, B. Avila, and E. E. Scalabrin, 
“Improving bilateral negotiation with evolutionary learning,” in 2008 
12th International Conference on Computer Supported Cooperative 
Work in Design, 2008, pp. 343–348. 
[13] S. K. Awasthi, S. R. Vij, D. Mukhopadhyay, and A. J. Agrawal, “Multi-
strategy based automated negotiation: BGP based architecture,” in 2016 
International Conference on Computing, Communication and 
Automation (ICCCA), 2016, pp. 588–593. 
[14] T. Baarslag, M. J. C. Hendrikx, K. V. Hindriks, and C. M. Jonker, 
“Learning about the opponent in automated bilateral negotiation: a 
comprehensive survey of opponent modeling techniques,” Auton Agent 
Multi-Agent Syst, vol. 30, no. 5, pp. 849–898, Sep. 2016. 
[15] L. Ilany and Y. Gal, “Algorithm selection in bilateral negotiation,” Auton 
Agent Multi-Agent Syst, vol. 30, no. 4, pp. 697–723, Jul. 2016. 
[16] Z. Vale, T. Pinto, H. Morais, I. Praça, and P. Faria, “VPP’s multi-level 
negotiation in smart grids and competitive electricity markets,” in 2011 
IEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting, 2011, pp. 1–8. 
Authorized licensed use limited to: UNIVERSIDAD DE SALAMANCA. Downloaded on May 27,2021 at 07:50:36 UTC from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply. 
